

- (6 pts) Let n be a positive integer. A *Latin square* of order n is a $n \times n$ array L of the integers $1, 2, \dots, n$ such that each of the n integers occurs exactly once in each row and each column of L . We denote by $L(i, j)$ the element in the i 'th row and j 'th column of L .

An example of a Latin square of order 3 is as follows.

1	2	3
3	1	2
2	3	1

Given any Latin square L of order n , we can define a cryptosystem where $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{C} = \mathcal{K} = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, and

$$e_i(j) = L(i, j), \text{ for all } i \in \mathcal{K} \text{ and } j \in \mathcal{P}.$$

Prove that this *Latin Square Cryptosystem* achieves perfect secrecy if every key is used with equal probability.

- (6 pts) Recall that for a connection polynomial $f(x)$ of a binary LFSR we have that $(f^*)^* = f$ and $\Omega(f)$ is the set of binary sequences generated using this LFSR. Further, we know that $\Omega(f)$ can also be expressed as a set of quotients of the form $P(x)/f^*(x)$, where $\deg(P(x)) < \deg(f(x))$.
 Now, let $f(x)$ and $g(x)$ be two connection polynomials of binary LFSRs. Give the proof of the following result: If $\Omega(f) \subset \Omega(g)$, then $f(x)$ divides $g(x)$.
- The *Autokey cipher* over the alphabet \mathbb{Z}_{26} is defined as follows. Given a key (k_1, k_2, \dots, k_m) , where $m \geq 1$, the plaintext $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}^n$, $n \geq m$ is encrypted to ciphertext $y = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ as follows

$$\begin{aligned} y_i &= x_i + k_i \pmod{26}, \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \dots, m, \text{ and} \\ y_i &= x_i + x_{i-m} \pmod{26}, \text{ for } i = m + 1, m + 2, \dots, n. \end{aligned}$$

- (3 pts) The attacker sees the ciphertext, and transforms it to sequence $z = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} z_i &= y_i, \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \dots, m, \text{ and} \\ z_i &= y_i - z_{i-m} \pmod{26}, \text{ for } i = m + 1, m + 2, \dots, n. \end{aligned}$$

Show that then z is equal to the ciphertext obtained by encrypting x using the $2m$ -periodic Vigenère cipher with keyword $(k_1, \dots, k_m, -k_1, -k_2, \dots, -k_m)$.

- (3 pts) Suppose the length m of the key of the autokey cipher is secret. Explain how the attacker can apply the *Index of Coincidence* method for finding m .
- (6 pts) Suppose that \mathbf{T}_1 and \mathbf{T}_2 are independent random variables which take on values from the set $\{0, 1\}$. We use c_i to denote the correlation of \mathbf{T}_i , $c_i = 2\Pr[\mathbf{T}_i = 0] - 1$, for $i = 1, 2$. Suppose that $c_1 = c_2 = 1/3$. Show that then the random variables \mathbf{T}_1 and $\mathbf{T}_1 \oplus \mathbf{T}_2$ are not independent.

Exam Calculator Policy. It is allowed to use a function calculator, however no programmable calculator.